[1]徐寿福 邓鸣茂.管理层股权激励与上市公司股票错误定价[J].南开经济研究官网,2020,(02):179.
 Xu Shoufu and Deng Mingmao.Managerial Equity Incentive and Stock Mispricing[J].Nankai Economic Studies,2020,(02):179.
点击复制

管理层股权激励与上市公司股票错误定价(  )
分享到:

《南开经济研究》官网[ISSN:1001-4691/CN:12-1028/F]

卷:
期数:
2020年02
页码:
179
栏目:
出版日期:
2020-04-22

文章信息/Info

Title:
Managerial Equity Incentive and Stock Mispricing
作者:
徐寿福 邓鸣茂
徐寿福,上海对外经贸大学金融管理学院、金融发展研究所、美国研究中心;邓鸣茂,上海对外经贸大学金融管理学院、美国研究中心
Author(s):
Xu Shoufu1 and Deng Mingmao2
1.School of Finance, Institute of Financial Development, Center of American Studies, Shanghai University of International Business and Economics, Shanghai 201620; China; 2. School of Finance, Center of American Studies, Shanghai University of International Business and Economics, Shanghai 201620; China
关键词:
错误定价股权激励代理成本契约要素
Keywords:
Stock Mispricing Equity Incentive Agency Cost Contract Element
摘要:
股票错误定价不仅产生于公司外部的市场因素,而且会受到公司内部代理成本的影响。股权激励处于上市公司内部利益协调的核心位置,既可能通过改善公司治理、降低代理成本而减轻股票错误定价,也可能恶化管理层代理问题而加剧股票错误定价。本文以2007—2015年中国上市公司股权激励计划为研究对象,采用基于倾向得分匹配的双重差分方法,实证检验了股权激励对股票错误定价的影响。首先,从总体上看我国上市公司股权激励计划的实施加剧了股票错误定价。其次,股权激励恶化了管理层代理问题,提高了代理成本,是股权激励加剧股票错误定价的重要机制之一;最后,契约要素对股权激励与股票错误定价的关系具有调节作用,激励强度能够削弱股权激励的负面影响,但采用股票期权作为激励标的物和设置更严格的业绩条件则会加剧股权激励的负面影响。本文的研究结果显示,从市场效率的角度而言,没有证据表明我国上市公司股权激励计划的实施发挥了正面的激励作用,科学设计和优化契约要素有助于克服股权激励计划的福利性质。
Abstract:
Both external market factors and internal agency cost of firm may result in stock mispricing. Since equity incentive is at the core of the internal interest alignment of public company, it can either alleviate mispricing by improve corporate governance and decrease agency costs, or worsen managerial agency problems and in turn exacerbate mispricing. This paper takes equity incentive schemes of Chinese public companies from 2007 to 2015 as research object, and uses DID-PSM to investigate the effects of equity incentive on stock mispricing. First, the implementations of equity incentive schemes have exacerbated stock mispricing of Chinese public companies. Next, agency cost has partial mediating effect while equity incentive affects stock mispricing, indicating that increasing agency cost is one of important mechanisms through which equity incentive improves stock mispricing. Finally, contract elements such as incentive intensity, incentive objects can moderate the effects of equity incentive schemes on stock mispricing. The results suggest that there should be no evidence of positive incentive and governance effects of Chinese public companies’ equity incentive schemes from the perspective of market efficiency, and scientific design and optimization of contract elements should facilitate to overcome shortcoming of equity incentive regarded as a welfare.
更新日期/Last Update: 2020-03-11