[1]王金杰,盛玉雪.社会治理与地方公共研发支出 ——基于空间倍差法的实证研究[J].南开经济研究官网,2020,(01):199-219.
 Wang Jinjie and Sheng Xuyue.Social Governance and Local Public R&D Expenditure:A Spatial Difference-in-Differences Analysis[J].Nankai Economic Studies,2020,(01):199-219.
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社会治理与地方公共研发支出 ——基于空间倍差法的实证研究(  )
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《南开经济研究》官网[ISSN:1001-4691/CN:12-1028/F]

卷:
期数:
2020年01
页码:
199-219
栏目:
出版日期:
2020-02-22

文章信息/Info

Title:

Social Governance and Local Public R&D Expenditure:A Spatial Difference-in-Differences Analysis

作者:
王金杰盛玉雪
Author(s):
Wang Jinjie1 and Sheng Xuyue2
1.School of Economics, Nankai University, Tianjin 30071, China; 2. Business School, Guangxi University, Nanning 530004, China)
关键词:
社会治理地方公共研发支出溢出效应空间倍差法
Keywords:
Social Governance Local Public Research and Development Expenditure Spillover Effect Spatial Difference in Difference Model
文献标志码:
A
摘要:
社会治理是政府内部与外部主体协同治理的制度安排,本文基于委托—代理理论构建社会治理影响地方公共研发支出的理论框架,提出社会治理的内部治理和外部协同使得政策效应具有特殊的空间属性,通过直接效应和溢出效应有效治理了由于地方政府与外部主体间信息不对称性而引起的政府失灵行为,进而对地方公共研发支出产生正向、负向并存的双向调节作用。进一步的,本文利用十八届三中全会以来社会治理作为准自然实验,建立空间倍差模型验证这种政策影响,结果发现,社会治理对地方公共研发支出具有双向调节作用,其中,社会治理的直接效应体现为降低地方公共研发支出,而溢出效应体现为增加地方公共研发支出,长期来看,社会治理政策的直接效果减弱但溢出效应得以维持,将使得地方公共研发支出规模有所扩大,且这一结论具备稳健性。因此,应持续实施社会治理政策,以进一步提升地方公共研发支出的规模和效率。
Abstract:
Social governance is the institutional arrangement between the internal governance of the government and the external organizations. Based on Principle-agent theory, the paper builds a theoretical framework ,and proposes that the policy effects of internal governance and external coordination of social governance have special spatial attributes,which has both direct effect and spillover effect to govern the government failures caused by information asymmetry and bias inconsistency through direct effects and spillover effects, , and it’s possible to play a dual-directional role that “squeeze” or “supplement” local public R&D. Furthermore, this paper takes the social governance policy since the 3rd Plenary Session of 18th CPC Central Committee as a natural experiment and builds spatial difference in difference model to test the impact of the policies. The result shows that the policy since the 3rd Plenary Session of 18th CPC Central Committee has bi-directional adjustment effect to local public R&D, in which the direct effect of governance of corruption is “squeeze”, while the spillover effect is “supplement”. In the long run, the direct effect of anti-corruption policies decreases, but the spillover effect maintains which will expend the local public R&D, and the result is robust. Therefore, the policies of governance of corruption should be implemented constantly to improve the amount and efficiency of local public R&D further.

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更新日期/Last Update: 2020-01-13